Conflict and Cooperation in the Red Sea | Council on Foreign Relations

The Red Sea is no longer merely a maritime corridor through which trade, energy, and supply chains pass. It has become a strategic space where national security, economic transformation, communications security, digital sovereignty, and the protection of the marine environment intersect. Accordingly, sources of instability in the Red Sea should not be understood solely as attacks against ships or threats to freedom of navigation. Such occurrences represent only the visible manifestation of a deeper imbalance within the broader maritime security architecture. Instead, analysis should begin with a wider reading of the principal drivers of instability that make this region increasingly fragile and vulnerable to escalation. 

Drivers of Instability in the Red Sea  

First, the issue of unresolved conflict zones in the region drives instability. The ongoing armed conflict in Sudan, the political and security fragility in Yemen, and the prolonged tensions in the Horn of Africa all make the region highly susceptible to escalating crises. In such an environment, armed groups are able to utilize the maritime domain as a tool for political pressure and to increase the costs imposed on adversaries, rather than solely as an arena for direct military operations. 

Second is the gap between the priorities of major powers and the Red Sea littoral states. International powers view the Red Sea and Bab al-Mandab primarily through the lens of securing trade and energy flows and protecting supply chains. However, littoral states adjacent to the Red Sea approach the space from a broader perspective linked to coastal security, port stability, development, combating smuggling and organized crime, protecting critical infrastructure, and preventing the spillover of crime and conflict from land into the maritime domain. Therefore, any approach will have limited effectiveness unless it is built upon clearer alignment between the strategic vision of international powers and the security and development needs of the coastal states. 

The third driver of instability in the region is economic, social, and environmental fragility. Rising poverty, increasing living costs, and marine environmental degradation in some littoral states weaken state capacity and create fertile environments for terrorism, smuggling, human and arms trafficking, and illegal, unreported, and unregulated fishing. In addition, the rise of what is increasingly referred to as “blue crime,†or transnational organized crime at sea, further erodes maritime security, transforming the sea from a source of development and economic connectivity into a space for illicit activities and security pressure.

The View From the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia 

From the perspective of the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia and the Red Sea coastal states, stability is not merely a matter of navigational security—it is directly connected to national, economic, and communications security, digital sovereignty, and trade resilience. 

The submarine cables crossing the Red Sea represent critical sovereign underwater infrastructure that is no less significant than oil and trade routes. Consequently, the most effective approach to securing the region must include the protection of those cables and other digital infrastructure alongside the protection of ports, in addition to enhancing maritime domain awareness, building the capacities of littoral states, and protecting the marine environment. Instability in the Red Sea does not stem from a single actor or a single crisis, but rather from the intersection of conflicts along the coasts and inland areas, economic and environmental fragility, weak governance, and competing international strategies. Addressing those challenges requires a regional framework that views the Red Sea as a shared strategic space, rather than merely a transit route for global trade.